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Field Experiments With Firms
Abstract
We discuss how the use of field experiments sheds light on long-standing research questions relating to firm
behavior. We present insights from two classes of experiments—within and across firms—and draw common
lessons from both sets. Field experiments within firms generally aim to shed light on the nature of agency
problems. Along these lines, we discuss how field experiments have provided new insights on shirking
behavior and the provision of monetary and nonmonetary incentives. Field experiments across firms generally
aim to uncover firms' binding constraints by exogenously varying the availability of key inputs such as labor,
physical capital, and managerial capital. We conclude by discussing some of the practical issues researchers
face when designing experiments and by highlighting areas for further research.
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F irms operate in complex environments: a list of the categories in which they need to make interrelated choices would include employee pay, pricing, product attributes, production technologies, and management. In 
turn, these decisions involve responding to characteristics that are often hard to 
measure or uncertain, such as those related to market characteristics, the produc-
tivity of individual inputs, and entrepreneurial ability. Due to the complexity of 
the environment, research that seeks to understand the behavior of fi rms based on 
observational data faces many challenges at uncovering causal relationships. In this 
paper, we illustrate how fi eld experiments, guided by economic theory, can address 
these challenges and provide new answers to long-standing questions about fi rms: 
Do fi rm choices maximize profi ts subject to constraints? If so, which constraints 
bind and inform decision making in fi rms? If not, why are fi rms operating inside 
the frontier?
In this paper, we review fi eld experiments that provide preliminary answers to 
these questions and map directions for further research. We organize our discus-
sion into two classes of work. The fi rst is fi eld experiments conducted within fi rms, 
in which the units of observation are workers or divisions of a fi rm. The theory 
behind many of these experiments views the fi rm as an organization, emphasizing 
agency problems. We discuss fi eld experiments that shed light on solutions to the 
agency problem, from incentive pay to social pressure and nonmonetary rewards. 
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The second strand covers fi eld experiments conducted between fi rms, in which the 
fi rm is the unit of observation. The theory behind most of these experiments views 
the fi rm through the lens of neoclassical production theory, and so we discuss 
how fi eld experiments have exogenously varied input availability to shed light on 
constraints fi rms face.
Throughout, we focus on experiments designed to shed light on fi rms’ behavior. 
This still leaves out a large class of fi eld experiments that are run in collaboration 
with fi rms to provide evidence on other issues such as consumer behavior or optimal 
auction design.1
Beyond the results of specifi c fi eld experiment studies, we also believe that 
economists can reap enormous benefi ts from establishing working partnerships 
with fi rms and engaging in primary data collection. Thus, we conclude the paper 
by offering some discussion of the practical issues researchers face in designing and 
implementing fi eld experiments in fi rms, and by highlighting research questions 
that remain relatively untouched by fi eld experiments. We hope that by the end of 
our discussion, readers have a clear sense of the costs and benefi ts of fi eld experi-
ments in fi rm settings, and are motivated to consider this approach themselves.
Field Experiments within Firms
Field experiments within fi rms are generally designed to shed light on how 
fi rms can solve agency problems and motivate their employees. In this section, we 
review evidence on the two classical solutions to this agency problem—monitoring 
and pay for performance—as well as more recent work on nonmonetary determi-
nants of motivation such as social relations or status rewards.
Although fi eld experiments within fi rms have experienced a recent resurgence, 
they are far from new. One of the fi rst series of fi eld experiments was conducted at 
the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company, near Chicago, in the 1920s. 
While the validity of their specifi c fi ndings has been questioned,2 these experiments 
lay the groundwork for many issues that are now considered part of mainstream 
personnel economics (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010a). For example, they led Mayo 
(1933) to stress that workers are motivated by both monetary and nonmonetary 
rewards from work, an idea that is being tested by the newest generation of fi eld 
experiments reviewed below.
1 Further discussion of fi eld experiments on fi rms is provided in Levitt and List (2009) where they discuss 
fi eld experiments related to how consumers respond to product attributes and pricing. On auctions, a 
nascent literature is now emerging that uses fi eld experiments to measure, for example, reserve price 
effects (Reiley, 2006; Brown and Morgan, 2009; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2009).
2 As one example, between 1924 and 1927 the level of lighting was systematically changed for experi-
mental groups in different departments (Mayo, 1933). Levitt and List (2011) recently recovered the 
thought-to-be-lost data from this experiment, and fi nd little evidence that workers reacted to the differ-
ences in lighting.
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Monitoring and Shirking
The standard agency framework with asymmetric information views employees 
as rational shirkers: that is, employees consider the marginal costs and marginal 
benefi ts of shirking, and decide on their level of effort. Firms thus choose compen-
sation and monitoring policies with shirking in mind. The theory suggests that a 
reduction in monitoring will tend to an increase in shirking. Moreover, an increase 
in shirking resulting from reduced monitoring should be greatest among individuals 
for whom the ongoing employment relationship is least valuable. Three concerns 
have plagued nonexperimental approaches to testing these ideas: 1) shirking 
behavior is hard to detect; 2) the ability of the econometrician to detect shirkers 
might be endogenously related to the employer’s monitoring practices; and 
3) unobserved factors, such as hiring policies, may lead monitoring and shirking 
outcomes to be correlated.
Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) address these challenges using 
a fi eld experiment run by a telephone solicitation fi rm across four of its 16 call 
centers. At each call center, telephone solicitors were paid a piece rate in which salary 
increased with the number of “successful” solicitations—where success was reported 
by the employees themselves. This piece rate created incentives for employees to 
overstate whether a donation had been promised. To curb opportunistic behavior, 
the employer monitored by calling back a fraction of those who were reported to 
have responded positively to a solicitation. Employees were informed when hired 
that their activities would be checked by callbacks. The results of each week’s call-
backs were communicated to both employees and their immediate supervisors, and 
calls found by the monitors to be unsuccessful were deducted from each individual’s 
weekly incentive pay. Stronger sanctions for such calls were not generally imposed 
on employees because it was understood that donors sometimes change their minds 
after agreeing to pledge money.
To see if the costs of this monitoring system could be reduced, the company 
simulated a lower audit rate by experimentally varying the fraction of bad calls that 
were reported back to employees and supervisors in the four experimental sites 
from 0 to 2 to 5 to 10 percent, while keeping the actual audit rate at 25 percent in 
all four sites. By working with the fi rm, the researchers were able to collect survey 
data on employee attitudes toward the job, their expected job tenure, and their 
perceived diffi culty of fi nding a comparable job.
The fi ndings indicate that workers’ responses are very heterogeneous. Between 
10 and 41 percent of the employees in the four experimental sites behave as 
“rational cheaters”—that is, they respond to a reduction in the perceived cost of 
opportunistic behavior by increasing the rate at which they shirk. The remaining 
59 to 90 percent of employees, however, do not increase shirking following the 
reduction in monitoring rates. Using the survey data collected, the authors fi nd that 
those employees who responded to reductions in monitoring tended to be those 
who perceived the employer as being unfair and uncaring and that, in contrast with 
the rational cheater model, individuals with good outside options did not increase 
shirking by more than other workers when the rate of monitoring declined. This 
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heterogeneity implies that the optimal monitoring scheme will need to balance the 
requirement to reduce the shirking behavior of some workers inclined to rationally 
cheat, against the desire to avoid monitoring costs for those unlikely to cheat under 
normal circumstances.
Monetary Incentives
In the many circumstances in which monitoring is not practically feasible, 
the agency problem can be addressed by designing incentive schemes that seek to 
align the employees’ interests with the principal’s. A wide class of schemes such as 
piece rates, bonuses, and prizes achieve this goal by making the employees’ pay an 
increasing function of their performance.
Agency theory makes precise that such “pay for performance” schemes affect 
productivity both by increasing the productivity of existing employees (the incen-
tive effect) and by attracting more-productive employees to the fi rm (the selection 
effect). The incentive effect arises because pay-for-performance schemes increase 
the marginal benefi t of effort, which leads employees to work harder, other things 
equal. The selection effect arises because high-ability employees who are capable 
of achieving high performance can achieve higher pay and are, thus, attracted by 
schemes that reward performance, other things equal. Both the incentive and selec-
tion effects increase the variance as well as the mean of productivity and pay, as 
more-able workers can respond more to the increase in incentive power.
Testing the rich predictions of agency theory using nonexperimental data faces 
serious econometric challenges, most importantly that observed incentive contracts 
might be endogenous to fi rm performance (Prendergast, 1999; Chiappori and 
Salanié, 2003). Field experimenters can tackle this challenge directly by engineering 
exogenous changes in incentive schemes across, or most commonly, within fi rms. 
Moreover, high-powered incentive schemes might affect productivity through chan-
nels that are typically not measured in secondary data. For instance, the increase 
in pay inequality can reduce workers’ morale and lead to sabotage, or the change 
in the composition of the peer group due to the selection effect might affect 
workers’ behavior over and above the effect of the compensation scheme. Field 
experimenters are well placed to work with fi rms to collect primary data on the 
relevance of these mechanisms, for instance by measuring social ties within the fi rm.
Among the fi rst of the fi eld experiments designed to measure incentive effects 
of monetary compensation schemes is that of Shearer (2004), who estimates 
the productivity gains moving from a fi xed wage to a piece rate scheme for tree 
planters in British Columbia, Canada. Workers were randomly assigned to plant 
under one of the incentive schemes at the start of a work day. Workers’ productivity 
increased by 20 percent moving from fi xed wages to piece rates. In line with the 
prediction of agency theory, the standard deviation of output across workers was 
higher under piece rates. Shearer also develops and estimates a structural model 
of workers’ behavior to shed light on: 1) what would have been the productivity 
gains if management had been imperfectly informed about planting conditions; 
and 2) how workers would have responded to an effi ciency wage scheme. This is a 
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“natural fi eld experiment,” to use the terminology explained in the introduction to 
this symposium and in Harrison and List (2004), because the workers did not know 
that the experiment was occurring.
Combining research methods like this is to be encouraged. In many scenarios, 
it would be ideal to combine evidence from fi eld experiments with structural 
modeling to posit an underlying behavioral mechanism behind the effects, to assess 
the sensitivity of the estimates to slight alterations in the economic environment, 
and to make headway in understanding the optimal compensation structures. Of 
course, the validity of the structural model can itself be tested by exploring whether 
it predicts the responses observed to the exogenous variation engineered by the 
fi eld experiment. For example, Cho and Rust (2010) follow this approach in using 
a fi eld experiment to validate a structural model of rental rates for automobiles.
While recent fi eld experiments have made substantial progress in identifying the 
causal effect of performance pay on workers’ effort, they have been less successful at 
pinning down selection effects.3 This is a priority for future research as the available 
nonexperimental evidence suggests that selection effects are at least as important 
as incentive effects. In a nonexperimental study that exploits the roll-out of a new 
piece rate scheme in a manufacturing fi rm, Lazear (2000) shows that selection 
effects explain half of the 44 percent increase in worker productivity that followed 
the introduction of piece rates. However, identifying selection effects poses a diffi cult 
challenge for fi eld experimenters both because it requires information on the entire 
pool of potential employees and because the time horizon of fi eld experiments is 
often considerably shorter than that needed for existing workers to quit and new 
workers to join a fi rm. Varying incentives across divisions or plants of the same fi rm 
while allowing employees to move across divisions might be a way to address both 
issues. Greater knowledge about selection effects would also help in understanding 
whether and how the compensation policies of a given fi rm have spillover effects on 
other fi rms that compete for similar workers—which in turn would help tie together 
the two disparate literatures on within-fi rm compensation policies and equilibrium 
wage-setting behavior.
Monetary Incentives and the Social Organization of the Workplace
Until recently, the importance of the interaction between social relations and 
monetary incentives in the workplace has been addressed mainly in the organiza-
tional and business sociology literatures. However, such concerns have begun to 
be incorporated in economic theory; for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) and 
Rotemberg (1994) extend standard agency models to take into account peer effects 
and social concerns. Moreover, credible evidence on the existence and magnitude 
of such social mechanisms has begun to emerge using nonexperimental methods in 
combination with personnel data (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and 
Rasul, 2010). Identifying the causal effects of social relations using nonexperimental 
3 Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) explore selection effects of incentives in a laboratory setting.
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data faces two main challenges: 1) the observed variation in incentives might be 
correlated with other unobservable determinants of performance; and 2) fi rm 
personnel records rarely contain information on social connections within the fi rm.4
In this section, we discuss a series of three of our own fi eld experiments 
(Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011) that provide novel evidence 
on the interplay of incentives and the social organization of the workplace, namely 
the social relations that exist between a group of coworkers or between workers 
and managers. The fi rm we study is a leading U.K. producer of “soft fruit”—a 
broad category that might include fruits like plums, cherries, peaches, strawberries, 
raspberries, and grapes. The fi rm’s hierarchy has four layers: the owner and chief 
executive offi cer, the general manager, fi eld managers, and workers. The main task 
of the bottom-tier workers is to pick fruit. Around 40 workers pick on any given fi eld 
on a given day. Within a fi eld, workers are allocated their own row of fruit to pick, 
and worker’s productivity is defi ned as kilograms picked per hour. Managers orga-
nize fi eld logistics: for example, they assign workers to rows and make sure workers’ 
full crates are replaced with empty ones. Managers also choose how much effort 
to exert and how to allocate this effort among different workers. In this setting, 
managerial effort is complementary to worker’s effort; for example, if a manager 
reassigns a worker to a new row as soon as that worker is done with the previous one 
and removes that worker’s full crates quickly, then even for a given effort level of the 
worker, the worker will be more productive.
The general manager, who is a permanent employee of the farm, decides which 
of the workers present on the farm are selected to pick fruit each day, which are 
assigned to non-picking tasks, and which are left unemployed for the day.
In our setting, workers and managers are hired seasonally from Eastern 
Europe and live on the farm for the duration of their stay; thus, they have oppor-
tunities to form social connections. These connections can be measured by asking 
workers to report colleagues to whom they are socially linked, or indirectly by 
using common characteristics—like a common language—that predict social 
links. In two of the three experimental seasons, the group of coworkers that a 
given worker is assigned to work with varies across fi elds and days, and this varia-
tion is orthogonal to other determinants of productivity. This creates plausibly 
exogenous variation in the presence of socially connected workers that can be 
used to identify the effect of social connections on behavior and productivity.
Our three experiments ran during the 2002, 2003, and 2005 picking seasons. 
The workforce changes annually, so that workers and managers are exposed 
to one experiment only. Each experiment induces exogenously timed changes to 
the incentive structure of one layer of the hierarchy. In all cases the experimental 
treatments are applied simultaneously to all relevant agents. The rationale behind 
the within-subject design is that, like most other fi rm settings, it was impossible to 
prevent information spillovers between treated and control groups. Moreover, the 
4 List and Rasul (2011) provide a more comprehensive review of this literature.
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composition of the workforce is fi xed for the duration of each season, thus we focus 
on incentive rather than selection effects throughout. One aspect of the experi-
mental design is that time-varying unobservables represent the main identifi cation 
threat. This is addressed by allowing fl exible interactions with time effects and by 
using difference-in-differences estimators that combine data from the experimental 
seasons and from 2004, during which no experiments were implemented.
In our fi rst experiment, we exogenously varied the workers’ compensation 
scheme from “relative compensation” to piece rates. Under relative compensation, 
workers are paid a unit price for each kilogram of fruit picked that is negatively 
related to average productivity on the fi eld-day—thus, if average productivity on 
a certain day was high, the unit price paid to workers is lower. Under piece rates, 
workers are paid for each kilogram of fruit picked. Under relative compensation, 
each worker imposes a negative externality on colleagues: any worker who increases 
effort will raise average productivity and so reduce the unit wage for all coworkers 
on the fi eld. Under piece rates, this externality does not exist. As a consequence, 
under relative compensation, the socially optimal level of effort is lower than the 
private optimum, whereas under piece rates, the two coincide. The comparison of 
productivity under the two schemes reveals whether, and to what extent, workers are 
able to cooperate.
In our 2005 paper, we show that productivity is 50 percent higher under 
piece rates. Calibration of the maximization conditions of worker’s individual 
effort choice problem reveals this productivity differential to be consistent with 
the assumption that under relative incentives, workers internalize the negative 
externality their effort imposes on coworkers. This social incentive is equiva-
lent to them placing a weight of two-thirds on all coworkers’ pay. We fi nd that 
workers internalize the externality more when they work alongside their friends 
as opposed to colleagues to whom they are not socially linked, and this effect is 
larger in smaller groups. Yet, the effects disappear under piece rates. Finally, we 
fi nd that cooperation collapses when workers cannot monitor each other; specifi -
cally, moving to piece rates does not increase workers’ productivity when they 
pick from a plant whose physical characteristics make it diffi cult for a worker to 
see colleagues. This fi nding rules out pure altruism as a mechanism to sustain 
cooperation in this setting.
Our second experiment exogenously varied managers’ pay from fi xed wages 
to fi xed wages plus a performance bonus that increases in the average produc-
tivity of the workers managed. In this experiment, workers were paid piece rates 
throughout. Our 2007 paper shows that the introduction of managerial bonuses 
increases both the mean and the dispersion of workers’ productivity. One reason, 
as theory suggests, is that after the introduction of performance pay, managers 
targeted their effort towards more-able workers. Another reason, again suggested 
by theory, is that workers with the highest productivity were more likely to be 
selected into the workforce when managers were paid performance bonuses. Least 
able workers were employed less often and workers at the bottom of the produc-
tivity distribution were never selected to pick.
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Our 2009 paper further analyzed the data from this second experiment, with 
a focus on the interplay between managerial incentives and the social connections 
between workers and managers. We fi nd evidence that when managers were paid 
fi xed wages, they targeted workers to whom they were socially connected, regardless 
of ability level. When managers were paid as a function of fi rm performance, they 
targeted high-ability workers, regardless of social connections. The fi ndings suggest 
that social connections have a sizable impact on productivity: when managers were 
paid fi xed wages, the average worker was 9 percent more productive on days when 
they were managed by someone to whom they were socially connected.
Our third experiment evaluates different compensation schemes under team 
production. From 2005 onwards, workers were organized in teams of fi ve. Workers 
were allowed to choose the composition of their team as long as all fi ve members 
agreed. Compared to previous seasons, the social organization of the workplace 
is thus endogenous. In Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2011), we compare three 
forms of team incentives: team piece rates, rank incentives (namely publicly 
provided information on each team’s productivity), and monetary prizes assigned 
to the most productive teams. The experiment is again closely tied to an underlying 
model that suggests two key forces that drive team formation: workers’ ability and 
social connections. On one hand, workers have incentives to match by ability. On 
the other hand, workers might prefer to form teams with friends, both because 
this might limit free-riding within teams and also because they enjoy nonpecuniary 
benefi ts from interacting with coworkers to whom they are socially connected. Our 
experiment is designed to exogenously alter the trade-off to sorting into teams by 
friendship relative to ability.
We show that strengthening incentives, either through rank incentives or 
monetary prizes, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar 
ability instead of with their friends. However, rank incentives and monetary prizes 
have opposite effects on average productivity: rank incentives signifi cantly reduce 
it by 14 percent, while monetary prizes signifi cantly increase it by 24 percent. Both 
effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at 
the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prizes only increase the 
productivity of teams at the top. Focusing on the teams that remain intact after each 
change in incentives, we show that the documented negative effect of rank incen-
tives is primarily due to the endogenous changes in team composition, rather than 
changes in behavior of the same team. In contrast, the provision of monetary prizes 
affects fi rm performance through both the endogenous changes in team composi-
tion and changes in behavior within the same team.
Taken together, this set of fi eld experiments yields several lessons. Social 
connections can drive behavior in the workplace: workers and managers internalize 
the effect of their effort on colleagues to whom they are socially connected. More-
over, social connections and monetary incentives interact, and the extent to which 
agents internalize the externality depends on the strength of monetary incentives. 
Firms should take these potential interactions into account. Indeed, such differ-
ences in the social organization of workplaces might help explain some part of 
Field Experiments with Firms     71
the productivity differences in otherwise observationally similar fi rms. This set of 
experiments also illustrates the advantages of combining the variation exogenously 
created by the fi eld experimenter (the incentive scheme) with other sources of 
variation that occur naturally in a real-world environment (social ties, monitoring 
possibilities, peer groups). This combination of experimental rigor and collecting 
primary data is perhaps the most attractive feature of fi eld experiments.
The fi ndings open up new questions for theoretical research on organizations. 
For instance, relative incentives led to lower productivity because workers internal-
ized the negative externality to some extent. This fi nding speaks directly to Lazear’s 
(1989) observation that workers are rarely compensated according to rank-order 
tournaments, and it points to new and interesting directions for the development of 
theory concerning the optimal provision of incentives under more-robust assump-
tions on worker preferences. More broadly, the fi ndings raise the issue of whether 
incentive policies are indeed chosen optimally, or whether fi rms are effectively 
within the effi ciency frontier. As we shall see, other fi eld experiments also cast doubt 
on whether fi rms make optimal choices. The concluding section will bring these 
together and discuss implications for future research.
New Topics in Within-Firm Field Experiments
A vigorous literature based on within-fi rm fi eld experiments is beginning to 
emerge. Some of the topics focus on organizational features of fi rms, extending 
the kind of approaches discussed above. For example, new fi eld experiments are 
being designed to test alternative ways to motivate employees. A natural candidate 
is nonmonetary incentives in the form of status or social recognition rewards, such 
as “employee of the month” job titles. The notion that individuals crave status has 
long been studied and more recently formalized (Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 2007; 
Besley and Ghatak, 2008). In a fi eld experiment run in collaboration with a public 
health organization, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2011) randomize 800 commu-
nity agents hired to sell condoms in urban compounds into four monetary and 
nonmonetary rewards treatments. Agents who are assigned to the nonmonetary 
rewards treatment—namely, stars for performance plus a public ceremony for 
top performers—sell twice as many condoms as agents who are offered a fi nancial 
margin on each pack sold.
Another personnel policy that is being subject to experimental scrutiny is the 
provision of performance feedback. In a recent fi eld experiment conducted with 
330 employees recruited via Mechanical Turk, a platform run by Amazon.com
for work submitted online, Barankay (2010) fi nds that the provision of indi-
vidual performance feedback about relative performance reduces the productivity 
of workers.
Despite rapid progress in these areas, evidence on other key organizational 
features is still lagging behind theory. The best example is perhaps the distribution 
of authority within fi rms, which has been at the core of theoretical studies of the 
fi rms since Coase’s (1937) seminal contribution. Modern theoretical work high-
lights the role of authority as a determinant of incentives (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) 
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or as a coordination device (Garicano, 2000; Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, 
2008). We envisage future fi eld experiments designed to shed light on the effect of 
organizational design on fi rm performance.5
Field Experiments across Firms
Field experiments that take the fi rm as the unit of observation often seek to 
exogenously vary the availability of key inputs and in this way seek to uncover the 
constraints faced by fi rms. Many of the experiments reviewed in this section are 
implemented in developing countries from South Asia to Latin America, both 
because identifying the constraints faced by these fi rms is key to understanding the 
development process and because, in practical terms, it is cheaper to create sizable 
shocks to inputs when the value of a fi rms’ stock of inputs is small.
Physical Capital and Access to Finance
A fi eld experiment by de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) among small 
and medium enterprises in Sri Lanka illustrates how fi eld experiments can illumi-
nate the long-standing question of how credit market imperfections and liquidity 
constraints may affect fi rm growth. They sample 408 enterprises, equally split 
between retail sales and manufacturing/services, that have less than $1,000 invested 
in capital. Around half were randomly assigned to receive one of four treatments: 
$100 in cash, $200 in cash, $100 in inventories or equipment, or $200 in inventories 
or equipment— in the last two treatments, as chosen by the fi rm owner. These trans-
fers are large compared to the existing capital stock and median monthly profi ts. 
The experiment was accompanied by a quarterly panel survey on investment deci-
sions, profi ts, and also personal characteristics of the owner such as wealth, risk 
aversion, and cognitive ability. The experiment was framed as random compensa-
tion for participation in the survey. Hence owners did not know about the existence 
or scope of the experiment.
The experiment yields three key fi ndings. First, both types of transfers increase 
capital stock and profi ts. Transfers also increase the hours worked by the owner, 
indicating complementarity between capital and labor hours. Second, the return to 
the additional capital is around 5–6 percent per month, giving a real annual return 
well above the market lending rate. Third, the authors develop a model that makes 
5 Nonexperimental evidence on the determinants of the distribution of authority and its effects on fi rm 
performance is also being established. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010) develop a survey instrument 
to measure the level of centralization of decision making in 4,000 fi rms across 12 countries, which shows 
that highly centralized structures are more likely to occur in developing countries and where product 
market competition is low. Wu (2011) exploits a natural experiment and detailed personnel data from 
a Chinese newspaper to provide evidence on the effect of centralizing decision-making authority on the 
effort and performance of managerial editors and reporters. In his setting, centralizing authority reduces 
the effort of managers and increases the effort of workers, overall increasing the quality of the average 
article. More importantly, authority has a signifi cant impact on incentives despite the fact that reporters 
were already on high-powered performance pay.
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precise how missing credit or insurance markets can generate the observed discrep-
ancy between returns to capital and lending rates. The balance of evidence indicates 
that results are driven by missing credit markets, not by risk aversion to borrowing.
Several methodological points are of note. First, using GPS coordinates, the 
authors show that the treatment has spillover effects on nearby fi rms. Interestingly, 
the authors show that spillovers are entirely driven by fi rms in the bamboo industry, 
where the harvesting of bamboo is subject to government restrictions and treated 
fi rms crowd out others by purchasing all of the available supply. These fi ndings illus-
trate the potential of fi eld experiments to shed light on the functioning of markets, 
not just fi rms in isolation. Second, the authors show how to deal with an attrition 
rate that was 5 percent higher for control fi rms than for treatment fi rms by using the 
methodology proposed by Lee (2009), which estimates upper and lower bounds for 
the treatment effect and allows them to show that the estimated treatment effects 
and return to capital are robust to attrition. Third, the authors also compare the 
difference between experimental and nonexperimental methods. Compared to a 
5.3 percent monthly return to capital estimated via experimental methods, ordinary 
least squares, random effects, and fi rm fi xed effects models yield estimates of 2.6, 
1.7, and 0.07 percent, respectively. 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) implemented the same experiment with 
137 small and medium-sized retail fi rms in Mexico, and also fi nd high rates of 
returns to capital, especially for fi rms that report being credit constrained/not 
having access to formal loans. Overall, these fi eld experiments provide a useful 
answer to an important question, as well as providing guidance for future fi eld 
experiments. In particular they illustrate how experiments can go beyond under-
standing the decision process of a single fi rm and provide evidence on the nature 
of spillovers and market interactions.
Managerial Capital and Enterprise Training
Economic theory has long taught that managerial capital is an important input 
in production (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1982). However, systematic empirical evidence 
about the effects of managerial capital was, until recently, almost nonexistent—in 
part because of the diffi culties in measuring managerial capital. In addition, mana-
gerial capital seems likely to be related to characteristics of the fi rm and perhaps 
to unobservable traits about management and workers in ways that made it very 
diffi cult to draw causal inferences.
Two recent methodological improvements have led to substantial progress in 
this area. First, some studies have focused on management practices that can be 
measured systematically. As they discussed in this journal, Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2010b) have developed a standard measure of management practices and used it 
to survey managers in 6,000 manufacturing fi rms in 17 developed and developing 
countries. Their work shows a robust correlation between the quality of manage-
ment practices and fi rm performance both across and within countries. Second, 
researchers have begun designing fi eld experiments aimed at evaluating the causal 
impact of managerial practices on fi rm performance.
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To evaluate the effect of business training on the performance of microenter-
prises, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) and Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2011) examine 
the experience of clients of a microfi nance institution in Peru and the Dominican 
Republic, respectively. Both studies randomize microentrepreneurs into a treat-
ment group that receives fi nancial training, including basic accounting, marketing, 
and pricing, and into a control group that does not. Common fi ndings emerge 
from these studies. Neither fi nds an effect of business training on sales, profi ts, 
or employment. Both fi nd that training reduces business seasonality by increasing 
sales in “bad” months. These are intriguing results and should lead to signifi cant 
advances in understanding the constraints faced by microenterprises.
Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) develop a fi eld experi-
ment to evaluate the effect of modern management practices on the performance 
of large Indian fi rms in the textile industry. Working in collaboration with a leading 
international management consulting fi rm, the researchers offered free manage-
ment consulting to a randomly selected group of 14 out of 20 plants belonging to 
17 large manufacturers. A further eight plants belonging to the same fi rms were 
also surveyed. The consulting intervention targeted 38 key practices that capture 
standard manufacturing principles in high-income countries.
The design of this fi eld experiment illustrates the trade-off between sample 
size and the complexity of the intervention needed to study a cross-section of 
large fi rms. Consultancy and data collection costs—$75,000 per treated fi rm, 
$20,000 per control plant—limited the sample size to 20 units. Standard statistical 
tests that rely on asymptotic properties cannot be used in this context because 
the number of observations is too small. Collecting data over a long time horizon 
partially helps as there are procedures that rely on asymptotic approximations 
along the time dimension (Ibragimov and Müller, 2010). In addition, statis-
tical power can be sustained in such small samples by collecting data directly 
from machine logs, focusing on similar fi rms using identical technologies, and 
collecting high-frequency repeated measures (McKenzie, 2011). The key fi nding 
is that managerial capital improved quality and effi ciency, reduced inventory, and 
raised average productivity by 11 percent. The resulting increase in yearly profi ts 
was estimated to be over 90 percent of the market cost of the consulting services 
that fi rms would have paid in the fi rst year.
Again, such fi ndings raise the obvious questions of why profi table practices 
were not adopted before the intervention. Interviews with owners and senior 
managers reveal that incorrect beliefs about the profi tability of the practices 
were the main cause of non-adoption, but even when these incorrect beliefs were 
pointed out, fi rms were very slow to adopt the new practices. Most of the owners 
attributed this to lack of time. However, it also seemed that most Indian textile 
fi rms did not need to adopt the new practices in order to compete with other 
domestic fi rms as high tariffs shielded them from international competition. The 
study thus raises what seems to be a recurrent question in fi eld experiments with 
fi rms: What are the constraints that discourage fi rms from making changes that 
clearly seem to be profi table?
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Labor
An alternative kind of between-fi rms study, more common in high-income 
countries, are fi eld studies designed to measure discriminatory practices by exog-
enously varying the applicant pool available to fi rms. The typical “audit” study 
presents employers with two sets of job applicants who are identical along all 
relevant employment characteristics except the characteristic of interest, like race, 
gender, or age (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993; Riach and Rich, 2002).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) design a fi eld experiment along these lines 
by sending résumés with randomly assigned white- or black-sounding names to over 
1,300 help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. They also randomly vary 
the quality of the résumé by adding experience, skills, or honors. They fi nd that 
white names receive 50 percent more callbacks for an interview than black names. 
This racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. Addition-
ally, the return to higher-quality résumés is higher for whites than blacks, implying 
that the racial gap is larger for more-qualifi ed applicants.
The authors fi ndings are consistent with a model of lexicographic search 
whereby the employers stop reading (and hence fail to see all credentials) once they 
see a black name. While such practice is indeed consistent with the fi ndings, more 
work is needed to provide direct evidence on its relevance compared to statistical and 
taste-based discrimination models. If the search process is lexicographic, future work 
needs to understand why such methods emerged in the fi rst place. Time constraints 
are one possible ingredient here; indeed, although time constraints are rarely made 
explicit in economic modeling of fi rms, they may help to explain experimental results 
in many diverse contexts. More generally, these types of audit experiments could be 
fruitfully applied to analyze the practical relevance of other applicant traits such as 
gender, education, and past employment history. This would allow one to provide a 
consistent picture of fi rms’ preferences and constraints on hiring decisions.
Practical Considerations
The growing literature using fi eld experiments on fi rms has begun to provide 
insights on long-standing areas of economic research related to fi rm behavior. In 
the hope that some readers may be interested in undertaking this kind of research, 
in this section we discuss two practical considerations that arise in doing such exper-
iments: design and ethical issues. In the fi nal discussion, we then draw together 
some common lessons from the studies presented to highlight some areas to which 
we think future research should be directed.
Design
The design of a fi eld experiment ought to be grounded in economic theory so 
that null and alternative hypotheses can be mapped back to an underlying model of 
fi rm behavior. Once null and alternative hypotheses are well defi ned, this will guide 
the collection of primary and secondary data.
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Researchers then need to choose the unit over which to introduce experi-
mental variation: for fi eld experiments involving fi rms, this can involve engineering 
experimental variation across fi rms or within a fi rm. For the former, the unit might 
be inputs, whose characteristics are exogenously varied across fi rms, or the unit 
might be fi rms themselves who are then exogenously assigned to different environ-
ments. This latter type of fi eld experiment design remains scarce, but we discuss 
potential developments below. For experimentation within fi rms, the unit is most 
often workers, although plants or fi rm divisions might also be used. For experimen-
tation at the worker level, at one end of the spectrum, workers are simultaneously 
randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, as is typically done in policy 
evaluation and in randomized controlled trials. At the other end of the spectrum, 
all workers are treated but the timing of the treatment is exogenously chosen by the 
researchers. Each approach has its own costs and benefi ts, and these are likely to 
differ across fi rm settings.
The main benefi t of having a control group is that common trends can be 
weeded out by using a difference-in-differences estimator. The main cost is that 
the estimated effect of the intervention might be biased because the control group 
might react to not having received the treatment. Whether this creates a positive 
or negative bias depends on whether the control group tries to differentiate them-
selves from, or to emulate, the treated group. This is a fi rst-order issue in fi eld 
experiments with fi rms, where it is often harder to isolate treatment and control 
groups geographically or informationally, so those in a control group are likely to 
fi nd out about the experiments. The threat of contamination can be eliminated 
by separating the groups, but this typically causes them to be subject to different 
workplace conditions, making the control group a weaker counterfactual for what 
would have happened to the treated in the absence of treatment.
Switching all agents between control and treatment groups at an exogenously 
chosen time has the benefi t of eliminating the contamination bias; also, to increase 
statistical power, the effect of treatment can be estimated by comparing each agent 
to that same agent without the treatment, thus eliminating all sources of unobserv-
able heterogeneity (List, Sadoff, and Wagner, 2010). The cost of this approach is 
that the estimated effect of the treatment might be biased because of unobserv-
able determinants of changes in behavior. This concern might be addressed by 
collecting a suffi ciently long time series during both treatment and control periods, 
or, if seasonality or cyclicality is a potential threat, by collecting information from a 
different period during which no treatment was introduced, to purge estimates of 
variation due to such naturally occurring fl uctuations. Switching all agents between 
control and treatment groups is a good approach for another, practical reason: 
fi rms often express unwillingness to treat similar workers in the same plant or fi rm 
location in different ways.
A recent fi eld experiment illustrates how different randomization strategies 
can lead to different estimates. Shi (2010) compares productivity under fi xed wages 
and piece rates for workers engaged in tree thinning in a fruit orchard in the state 
of Washington. As the fi rm has multiple sites, in one site she switched ten workers 
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simultaneously from wages to piece rates and observed them for three days under 
each treatment, whereas in another site she switched seven workers to piece rates 
and kept another seven as controls with fi xed wages for one day, identifying the effect 
from the difference-in-differences between the two days. The estimated produc-
tivity increase is 23 percent in the fi rst design—similar to the estimates in Shearer 
(2004)—while the estimated effect increases to 43 percent in the second design. 
Shi (2010) reports that workers in the control group learned of the existence of a 
treatment group and were not pleased. This could have reduced their productivity, 
leading to an overestimate of the effect, but her data is not rich enough to shed light 
on the mechanism. Understanding such contamination effects is crucial to being 
able to compare fi ndings across experiments, and such issues are beginning to be 
explored by fi eld experimenters.
Ethics
Field experiments involve human subjects and thus typically fall under the 
oversight of an institutional review board run by an institution of higher educa-
tion or a funding agency. In turn, these boards are typically guided by the ethical 
principles set forth by a U.S. government report called the Belmont Report (named 
after the conference center where it was drafted in 1978). The three fundamental 
ethical principles in the Belmont Report for all human subjects research are respect 
for persons, benefi cence, and justice.6 Recent years have seen some convergence in 
institutional review board practices across institutions.
One question of particular interest to economists is whether all participants 
in an experiment must consent in advance, as the knowledge of participating in 
an experiment may bias the results. A common rule is that institutional review 
boards may waive informed consent and allow the use of such “deception” if certain 
conditions are met: First, the research involves no more than minimal risk. Second, 
the waiver will not impact adversely subjects’ rights and welfare, which includes no 
reduction in compensation, employment benefi ts, or mental well-being. (Moreover, 
if subjects do not wish to participate in the research there is to be no adverse effect 
on them either.) Third, the research could not practically be carried out without 
the waiver. Finally, subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information 
about participation—a condition which can often be met by debriefi ng subjects at 
the end of the study.
The granting of waivers of informed consent varies across institutional review 
boards. Some simply allow the waiver. Other boards require subjects to be informed 
that they are part of a research study (rather than an “experiment”), that they can 
opt out of the study without any consequence, and that they are provided with the 
contact details of the researcher. This need not compromise the conduct of fi eld 
experiments within fi rms as long as such requirements are equally applied to treat-
ment and control groups.
6 The report (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, 1979) is located at 〈http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/〉.
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A distinctive characteristic of fi eld experiments with fi rms that has important 
implications for how fi eld experiments should be judged by institutional review 
boards is that fi rms are likely to experiment on their own, or be advised by for-profi t 
consultancies, and the ethical guidelines they must adhere to in such cases are likely 
to be much less stringent than those faced by academics.7 Academic researchers might 
then be crowded out by for-profi t evaluation consultancies that are not subject to the 
same ethical requirements, and this might reduce the involvement of academics in 
fi eld experiments and create a strong selection among the type of experiments that 
can be subject to scientifi c scrutiny. The severity of this concern will depend on the 
evolving attitude of institutional review boards with regard to academics’ involvement 
with fi rms. For instance, will researchers be allowed to advise fi rms on experiments 
that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but would be implemented regardless 
of academic involvement? Will researchers be allowed to analyze data from experi-
ments that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but were initiated by the fi rms 
themselves? The answers to these questions will have profound implications for the 
future of fi eld experiments with fi rms.
Common Lessons and Future Directions
Field experiments are at the heart of a growing empirical literature that is 
expanding economists’ understanding of fi rm behavior. In this concluding discus-
sion, we draw together some common lessons from these studies and suggest some 
future directions.
A common feature of most fi eld experiments with fi rms is that they identify 
partial equilibrium effects, as they typically affect only one or at most a sample of 
fi rms within one industry. General equilibrium effects might of course differ from 
the partial equilibrium effects, depending in part on whether the returns to the 
experimental innovation can be competed away. For instance, if high-powered 
incentives benefi t the fi rm by attracting better workers, no fi rm can gain by offering 
high-powered incentives when all fi rms do the same. In contrast, if high-powered 
incentives increase workers’ productivity, then all fi rms can benefi t from offering 
high-powered incentives, thus increasing aggregate productivity.
The question that then naturally arises is: if these aggregate gains are possible, 
why don’t fi rms reap them? Indeed, one puzzling fi nding is that almost all the fi eld 
experiments reviewed have brought large benefi ts to the fi rm. In part, this pattern 
arises because fi rms would not agree to implement experiments that are expected 
to have detrimental consequences! Yet the fact that in so many cases researchers 
have managed to increase profi ts appears at odds with the common assumption 
that fi rms are pressured by competitive forces to make at least close-to-optimal 
choices. For example, the incentive schemes introduced in our fi eld experiments 
7 We thank the editor, David Autor, for raising this point.
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at the fruit-picking fi rm increased productivity and profi ts, and were later kept 
in place by the fi rm. Likewise, the modern managerial practices introduced by 
Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) at large textile fi rms in 
India increased profi ts and were kept in place after the end of the experiment. 
In both cases, the owners attributed the failure to explore these options earlier as 
due to the high opportunity cost of their time. The same constraint seems to be 
binding both in very competitive environments, as experienced by the soft fruit 
fi rm we analyzed in Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007), and in settings where 
competition is very mild, as for the fi rms surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, 
McKenzie, and Roberts (2011).
This fi nding suggests promising new avenues for future research on the 
importance of time constraints in fi rms. The importance of time constraints at 
the top tiers of organizational hierarchies has been recognized in theory (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000), but evidence on whether and how managers 
allocate their time to maximize fi rm performance is scant. Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, 
and Sadun (2011) have developed a survey methodology to measure how chief 
executive offi cers spend their time, and show how the pattern of time allocation can 
be used to provide observational evidence on the internal and external constraints 
faced by fi rms. Combining this survey methodology with fi eld experiments holds 
potential for making substantial progress in understanding these issues.
In turn, scarcity of managerial time can be symptomatic of two other problems. 
First, if the owner or chief executive offi cer must control all aspects of the business, 
the scope and size of the fi rm is necessarily limited. Delegation of authority and 
decision making is an essential ingredient for fi rm expansion, and yet we have a very 
limited empirical understanding of why some owners fail to delegate. Agency prob-
lems and the inability to motivate lower-tier managers intuitively seem important, 
as reported by the fi rm owners surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and 
Roberts (2011), but more evidence is needed on how these can be tackled. Field 
experiments that vary the distribution of authority or the agency constraints could 
potentially provide this. Second, there is often a lack of managers with adequate 
human capital and talent, whether due to a market failure in education or a skewed 
distribution of talent. These constraints are not amenable to experimental variation, 
but by providing evidence on the internal constraints of fi rms, fi eld experiments 
can help guide research on these topics, too.
Our discussion so far has been based on the assumption that fi rms maximize 
profi ts subject to constraints. But rather than focusing on constraints to optimizing 
behavior, a growing body of observational studies suggests the alternative view that 
fi rms might not maximize profi ts, either because they are led by managers who 
enjoy the “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) or because they are owned 
by families whose objective function has a nonmonetary component deriving from 
direct control (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). A burgeoning body of work uses fi eld 
experiments to understand consumer preferences and optimizing behavior. It is 
worth exploring whether similar strategies could be adopted to shed light on depar-
tures from the assumption of profi t maximization by fi rms.
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Field experimenters have also begun to explore the behavior of not-for-profi ts. 
While there exists a vibrant literature using fi eld experiments on the fund-raising 
activities of such organizations, many other issues remain unexplored. Theoretical 
contributions from Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) make 
clear that the provision of incentives for pro-social tasks raises different issues than 
for private tasks on at least two dimensions: First, to the extent that agents engaged 
in pro-social tasks are intrinsically motivated, fi nancial rewards that might success-
fully elicit effort for private tasks could actually reduce effort if the rewards crowd 
out intrinsic motivation. Second, the type of incentive mechanism might affect 
the composition of the pool of agents who choose to participate in the activity. In 
particular, high-powered fi nancial incentives might attract individuals who are moti-
vated by fi nancial returns instead of individuals who share the pro-social orientation 
of the organization, with undesirable consequences. Laboratory experiments show 
that the effect of fi nancial rewards differs when the task has social value. But fi eld 
evidence on these issues is scant.
Another question, with many practical implications, is how do fi rms and 
individuals at different layers of the hierarchy match endogenously based on their 
respective characteristics? The fact that many observed outcomes can be ascribed to 
endogenous matching is often a limitation of observational studies (Ackerberg and 
Botticini, 2002). Field experiments on discrimination provide some evidence on 
how fi rms hire workers, but many questions remain open. We envisage fi eld experi-
ments that create exogenous variation in the parameters of the matching process, 
by, for instance, varying the information set available to employers and employees, 
or by reducing search costs through the introduction of electronic market places 
where employers and employees can meet. Advancing the methodology in these 
directions, perhaps in some cases intervening at the level of markets as a whole, 
would take fi eld experiments into an exciting new realm.
■ We have benefi ted from discussions with Nava Ashraf, David Autor, Stefano DellaVigna, 
Chad Jones, John List, Stephan Meier, Andrea Prat, David Reiley, Timothy Taylor, and 
seminar participants at the Econometric Society Meeting in Denver, 2011.
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